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Abstract	
The	guiding	spirit	of	the	Keynesian	Revolution	is	that	full	employment	is	a	goal	which	
can	be	pursued	not	 by	 following	 the	 free	market	 rules,	 but	 by	 reshaping	 them	by	means	of	
public	intervention.	This	message	was	widely	accepted	for	thirty	years	as	from	the	end	of	the	
Second	World	War	by	all	 the	advanced	countries	which	actively	engaged	 in	 full	employment	
and	welfare	policies,	and	subsequently	abandoned	with	the	neo-liberal	Restoration	which	saw	
the	dogmas	of	individualism	and	de-regulation	prevailing.	In	reclaiming	the	topical	importance	
of	the	General	Theory,	we	should	take	into	consideration	the	changed	circumstances	of	today’s	
world	when	compared	 to	 those	of	 twenty	–	 let	alone	eighty	–	years	ago,	although	 there	are	
notable	 similarities	 between	 the	Great	Depression	 of	 the	 1930s	 –	 Keynes’s	world	 –	 and	 our	
contemporary	 crisis.	 However,	 his	 prescription	 for	 a	 better	 society	 is	 still	 relevant:	 it	 lies	 in	
setting	rules	and	limitations	in	the	market	arena,	not	letting	individual	self-interest	prevail,	and	
putting	some	governing	bodies	 in	charge	of	 filling	the	gap	when	deficient	aggregate	demand	
occurs,	so	that	the	acquisition	of	material	goods	and	the	fruition	of	the	enjoyments	of	life	be	
not	a	privilege	of	the	few	but	the	conquest	of	civilization.	
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In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 2007-8	 crisis,	 the	 name	 of	 Keynes	 has	 again	 entered	 the	 list	 of	
economists	to	be	read,	whose	ideas	are	to	be	taken	seriously.	After	over	twenty-five	years	of	
ostracism,	spent	praising	the	efficiency	of	free	markets	and	running	econometric	tests	to	prove	
that	economic	policies	are	either	ineffectual	or	even	irrelevant,	there	has	been	an	upsurge	in	
the	wave	of	references	to	Keynes	 in	the	media.	Unfortunately,	this	has	not	been	reflected	 in	
the	 academic	 scene,	 still	 dominated	 by	 the	 macroeconomics	 of	 anti-	 or	 pre-Keynesian	
inspiration	that	took	hold	between	the	1970s	and	1980s.	
To	 reclaim	 the	 topical	 importance	 of	 The	 General	 Theory	 of	 Employment,	 Interest	 and	
Money,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 begin	 by	 pointing	 out	 how	 the	 space	 assigned	 to	 government	
intervention	has	shrunk	in	contemporary	public	opinion;	 it	was	the	“policy	space”	opened	up	
by	Keynes’s	denunciation	that	market	laws	are	neither	natural	nor	unchangeable.	The	guiding	
spirit	of	the	Keynesian	Revolution	is	that	full	employment	is	a	goal	which	can	be	pursued	not	
by	 following	 the	 free	market	 rules,	 but	 by	 reshaping	 them	by	means	 of	 public	 intervention.	
This	message	was	widely	accepted	for	thirty	years	as	from	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	by	
all	the	advanced	countries	which	actively	engaged	in	full	employment	and	welfare	policies,	and	
subsequently	 abandoned	 with	 the	 neo-liberal	 Restoration	 which	 saw	 the	 dogmas	 of	
individualism	and	de-regulation	prevailing.	
In	reclaiming	the	topical	importance	of	the	General	Theory,	we	should	of	course	take	into	
consideration	the	changed	circumstances	of	today’s	world	when	compared	to	those	of	twenty	
–	 let	 alone	 eighty	 –	 years	 ago,	 although	 there	 are	 notable	 similarities	 between	 the	 Great	
Depression	 of	 the	 1930s	 –	 Keynes’s	 world	 –	 and	 our	 contemporary	 crisis1.	 A	 corresponding	
similarity	is	to	be	seen	between	the	economic	theory	prevailing	before	Keynes’s	times	and	that	
of	our	own	times.	(See	Wray	2013).	
The	return	to	Keynes	I	would	like	to	see,	arguing	for	its	topical	relevance,	is	firstly	in	the	
realm	 of	 method.	 In	 a	 famous	 letter	 to	 George	 B.	 Shaw,	 written	 a	 few	 weeks	 before	 the	
publication	of	 the	General	 Theory	 in	 February	 2016,	 Keynes	 announced	 it	 as	 a	 book	 “which	
will	 largely	 revolutionise	 […]	 the	way	 the	world	 thinks	 about	 economic	problems”	 (CWK	
XIII:	492).	And	in	the	same	letter	he	added:		
“When	my	 new	 theory	 has	 been	 duly	 assimilated	 and	mixed	with	 politics	 and	 feelings	 and	
passions,	 I	 can’t	predict	what	 the	 final	upshot	will	be	 in	 its	effect	on	action	and	affairs.	But	
there	will	be	a	great	change”	(CWK	XIII:	493).		
Rather	than	 invoking	the	“scientific”	aspect	of	his	theory,	Keynes	turned	to	“politics	and	
feelings	 and	passions”,	 to	 anticipate	 how	his	message	would	 be	 received.	 A	 couple	 of	 years	
later,	in	a	letter	to	Roy	Harrod,	recalling	the	story	of	Newton’s	discovery	of	the	law	of	gravity	
on	 observing	 an	 apple	 fall	 to	 the	 ground	 while	 sitting	 in	 the	 garden	 of	 Trinity	 College,	
Cambridge,	 Keynes	 listed	 the	 questions	 that	 an	 economist	 should	 be	 asking:	 for	 instance,	
whether	
“the	fall	of	the	apple	to	the	ground	depended	on	the	apple’s	motives,	on	whether	it	is	worth	
while	 falling	 to	 the	 ground,	 and	 whether	 the	 ground	 wanted	 the	 apple	 to	 fall,	 and	 on	
mistaken	 calculations	 on	 the	part	 of	 the	 apple	 as	 to	 how	 far	 it	was	 from	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
earth”	(CWK	XIV:	300).		
Economics	–	Keynes	wrote	–	“deals	with	 introspection	and	with	values	 [...]	 it	deals	with	
motives,	 expectations,	 psychological	 uncertainties’	 (CWK	 XIV:	 300),	 whose	 scope	 is	 neither	
“constant	 nor	 homogeneous”.	 There	 cannot	 be	 an	 analogy	 with	 physical	 sciences,	 because	
they	 aim	 at	 discovering	 regularities	 from	 which	 to	 derive	 general	 laws,	 while	 economics	 is	
expected	 to	 capture	 the	 effects	 of	 decisions	 taken	 in	 an	 uncertain	 environment	 and	 with	
																																								 																				
11	See	Sylos	Labini	(2009),	Temin	(2010),	Shapiro	(2012)	and	Eichengreen	(2012).	
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different	 degrees	 of	 information.	 So	 the	 object	 of	 economic	 theory	 is	 that	 of	 developing	 a	
logical	way	of	thinking	about	factors,	which	are	“transitory	and	fluctuating.”	(CWK	XIV:	297).	
When	Keynes	states	in	the	General	Theory	that	the	level	of	employment	oscillates	around	
“an	 intermediate	 position”	 below	 full	 employment	 and	 above	 the	 minimum	 subsistence	
employment	(CWK	VII:	254),	he	explains	that	this	position	“is	a	fact	of	observation	concerning	
the	world	as	it	is	or	has	been,	and	not	a	necessary	principle	which	cannot	be	changed”	(ibid).	
The	point	made	here	is	that	in	economics		
“we	cannot	hope	to	make	completely	accurate	generalisations”	(ibid.)	because	the	economic	
system	is	not	ruled	by	‘natural	forces’	that	economists	can	discover	and	order	in	a	neat	pat-
tern	of	 causes	 and	effects.	 The	 task	of	 economics,	 according	 to	Keynes,	 is	 rather	 to	 “select	
those	variables	which	can	be	deliberately	controlled	and	managed	by	central	authority	in	the	
kind	of	system	in	which	we	actually	live”	(ibid.).		
Keynes’s	 critique	 is	 directed	 against	 a	 conception	 of	 economics	 as	 scientific	 study	 of	
society	modelled	on	the	method	of	the	physical	sciences,	and	it	is	a	plea	to	start	investigating	
the	 problems	 involved	 in	 seeking	 to	 bring	 about	 desired	 end	 states.	 Only	 by	 exposing	 the	
fallacy	of	the	analogy	of	economic	laws	with	physical	laws	does	it	become	possible	to	promote	
values	and	attitudes	to	change	society.	Keynes	wrote:	
“it	 is	 many	 generations	 since	 men	 as	 individuals	 began	 to	 substitute	 moral	 and	 rational	
motive	as	their	spring	of	action	 in	place	of	blind	 instinct.	They	must	now	do	the	same	thing	
collectively”	(CWK	XVII:	453)	
Letting	 individuals	be	 guided	by	 self-interest	 alone	–as	 in	Adam	Smith’s	parable	of	 “the	
butcher,	the	brewer	and	the	baker”,	whose	pursuit	of	individual	profit	produces	a	social	good	–
is	 not	 a	 principle	 of	 general	 validity,	 because	 there	 are	 not	 always	 forces	 to	 harmonize	
individual	 interests	 and,	 moreover,	 aggregate	 economic	 behaviour	 does	 not	 have	 the	 same	
outcome	 as	 individual	 economic	 behaviour.	 If	 the	 goal	 is	 to	 change	 the	 environment	within	
which	 individuals	 operate,	we	ought	 to	 change	 the	way	we	 see	 the	economic	problem.	 This	
could	be	achieved,	according	 to	Keynes,	 through	 the	power	of	persuasion.	 In	a	 letter	 to	T.S.	
Eliot	of	5	April	1945,	he	wrote:		
	“[...]	 the	 main	 task	 is	 producing	 first	 the	 intellectual	 conviction	 and	 then	 intellectually	 to	
devise	the	means.	Insufficiency	of	cleverness,	not	of	goodness,	is	the	main	trouble	[...]	the	full	
employment	 policy	 by	 means	 of	 investment	 is	 only	 one	 particular	 application	 of	 an	
intellectual	theorem.	(CWK	XXVII:	384)”.	
And	earlier	on,	in	a	famous	speech	to	the	House	of	Lords	on	May	23,	1944,	he	wrote:	
“[for	 the	 last	 twenty	 years]	 I	 have	 spent	my	 strength	 to	 persuade	my	 countrymen	 and	 the	
world	at	large	to	change	their	traditional	doctrines	and,	by	taking	better	thought,	to	remove	
the	curse	of	unemployment”	(CWK	XXVI:	16).	
Clearly,	by	“better	thought”,	Keynes	meant	a	theory	which,	among	other	things,	made	the	
elimination	 of	 unemployment	 possible,	 rejecting	 the	 doctrine	 that	whatever	 unemployment	
there	 is	 –	 as	 long	 as	 it	 is	 market	 generated	 –	 is	 a	 level	 which	 the	 same	market	 forces	 –	 if	
unimpeded	by	“rigidities”	(any	of	these:	prices,	wages,	interest	rate)	would	re-establish	in	the	
long	 run.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	why	 in	modern	macroeconomics	 this	 level	 has	 been	 labelled	 as	
“natural”.	
In	 the	aftermath	of	 the	Second	World	War	we	witnessed	a	 transformation	of	economic	
theory	into	a	set	of	models	which,	although	at	the	cost	of	extreme	simplification,	were	thought	
able	 to	 capture	 the	 fundamentals	 of	 the	 economic	 system	 they	 were	 describing;	 it	 was	
believed	that	models	enabled	empirical	verifications	of	the	variables	and	offered	the	means	to	
provide	the	tools	for	policy	intervention.	
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The	 stress	 on	 forecasting,	 measurement,	 empirical	 testing	 was	 meant	 to	 enhance	 the	
scientific	 aspect	 of	 economics,	 where	 “scientific”	 again	 implied	 resemblance	 to	 the	 physical	
science,	to	their	rigour	and	predictive	power.	
After	 Lionel	 Robbins	 (1932)	 had	 declared	 that	 ethics	 and	 political	 philosophy	
considerations	 should	 be	 banned	 from	 economic	 theory,	 Karl	 Popper	 in	 the	 1930s	 (Popper	
[1935]	1959)	vindicated	the	idea	that	economics	could	be	a	science	only	if	value-free	and	with	
predictive	power.	
In	 the	 following	 two	 decades	 Friedman's	 insistence	 on	 prediction	 as	 the	 only	 test	 for	
economic	 theories	and	Samuelson's	mathematization	of	economics	gave	a	new	boost	 to	 the	
faith	 in	 imitation	of	 the	physical	 sciences	as	 far	as	 the	chosen	method	of	 scientific	 inquiry	 is	
concerned.		
It	 is	now	apparent	that	this	conception	of	what	constitutes	a	good	economic	theory	has	
not	 proved	 reliable,	 having	 had	 –	 especially	 in	 the	 recent	 crises	 –	 many	 examples	 of	 the	
inadequacy	of	mainstream	theory	in	understanding	let	alone	predicting	forthcoming	events.	If	
facts	 are	 identified	with	 empirical	 estimates	 of	models	 that	 are	 believed	 to	 incorporate	 the	
progress	made	in	the	economic	literature,	 it	 is	clear	that	these	“facts”	are	heavily	dependent	
on	 the	 choice	 of	 the	models	 and	 the	methodology	 employed	 to	 find	 them.	 The	 relationship	
between	 facts	 and	 theory	 becomes	 opaque	 and	 we	 may	 reasonably	 challenge	 the	 motives	
behind	 the	 discovery	 of	 “facts”,	 for	 they	 tend	 to	 be	 recognized	 or	 ignored	 according	 to	 the	
ebbs	and	flows	of	academic	fashions.	Let	me	take	an	example	that	is	recent	history.	
My	example	is	the	multiplier	–	the	heart	of	the	Keynesian	theory	of	effective	demand––	
which	has	a	story	of	alternate	acceptance	and	rejection	in	its	over	70	years	of	existence.	It	is	a	
formula	 telling	 us	 that	 every	 increase	 in	 autonomous	 expenditure	 (for	 instance	 private	 or	
public	investment	or	exports)	generates	–	through	induced	expenditure	(net	consumption,	i.e.	
allowing	for	taxation	and	imports)	–	an	increase	in	income	greater	than	the	initial	expenditure,	
provided	 there	 are	 capacity	 underutilisation	 and	 unemployment.	 This	 is	 why	 the	 formula	 is	
called	the	“multiplier”,	because	typically	it	gives	a	number	greater	than	1.		
Deficit	spending,	i.e.	a	level	of	public	spending	greater	than	tax	revenue	–	is	justifiable	on	
two	counts:	a)	because	it	creates	income;	b)	because	it	generates	the	savings	and	tax	revenues	
(both	 functions	 of	 the	 level	 of	 income)	 necessary	 to	 finance	 the	 initial	 investment.	 The	
consensus	on	 this	proposition	 lasted	 for	almost	30	years	until	 it	was	 seriously	 challenged	by	
the	Monetarist	assault	of	the	late	sixties.	Building	on	his	(and	Franco	Modigliani’s)	earlier	work	
on	 the	 consumption	 function,	Milton	 Friedman,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 empirical	 estimate,	 showed	
that	 the	 independent	 variable	 in	 the	 consumption	 function	 was	 not	 current	 income,	 but	
income	that	can	be	assumed	to	be	perceived	as	permanent	over	an	individual	life-time.			
When	 consumption	 is	 made	 a	 function	 of	 permanent	 rather	 than	 current	 income,	 the	
value	 of	 the	multiplier	 becomes	much	 smaller,	 with	 the	 result	 that	 the	 whole	 idea	 that	 an	
increase	in	autonomous	expenditure	is	expansionary	was	lost,	sowing	the	seeds	for	mistrust	of	
fiscal	 policy	 as	 a	 means	 to	 reach	 full	 employment.	 This,	 which	 came	 to	 be	 named	 The	
Monetarist	 Counterrevolution,	 was	 taken	 further	 by	 Robert	 Lucas	 and	 the	 New	 Classical	
economists	 well	 into	 the	 1990s,	 meeting	 with	 feeble	 defence	 by	 the	 New	 Keynesians,	 who	
relegated	 the	 efficacy	 of	 the	 multiplier	 to	 the	 very	 short	 period,	 when	 prices	 and	 wage	
rigidities	prevented	the	system	from	getting	into	full	employment	equilibrium.	
Until	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 2007-8	 crisis	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 economic	 profession	 in	
prestigious	universities	and	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF,	and	in	influential	
media	 such	 as	 the	 Financial	 Times	 and	 the	 Economist,	 agreed	 that	 the	 scant	 value	 of	 the	
multiplier	was	conclusive	proof	of	the	limited	or	even	null	impact	of	public	expenditure	on	the	
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level	 of	 income	 and	 employment.	 The	 classical	 arguments	 against	 short-term	 policy	
interventions	–	the	lags	in	making	economic	policy	and	further	lags	in	the	implementation	and	
effects	after	the	policy	is	enacted	–	coupled	with	the	assumptions	on	the	countering	effects	of	
expectations	and	actions	of	rational	agents	who	observe	the	government’s	policy	process,	had	
made	 it	 appear	 practically	 impossible	 for	 policymakers	 to	 time	 fiscal	 policy	 actions	 to	 jump-
start	the	economy.		
In	the	1950s	and	1960s,	when	Keynesianism	was	at	its	height,	the	multiplier	was	generally	
assumed	 to	 be	 about	 2	 (two).	 Then,	 in	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s,	 these	 estimates	 gradually	
dropped,	leaving	the	consensus	range	about	0.5-0.7.	However,	the	value	of	the	multiplier	was	
again	 closer	 to	 1	 after	 the	 crisis.	 In	 fact,	 in	 2009	 the	 estimates	 by	 both	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	
European	 Union	 showed	 the	 value	 of	 the	 multiplier	 in	 the	 range	 of	 0.9	 and	 1.7	 (Marcuzzo	
2014).	At	last	the	multiplier	is	multiplying	again,	since	it	cannot	be	denied	against	the	evidence	
of	the	effects	of	drastic	cuts	in	public	expenditure	brought	about	by	austerity	programmes	in	
Europe.	
This	 is	 just	 one	 example	 of	 how	 empirical	 evidence	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 depends	 on	 the	
nature	of	the	models	that	are	constructed	to	find	it,	and	also	on	the	behavioural	assumptions	
embedded	 in	 these	 models.	 In	 orthodox	 economics,	 consumers	 are	 said	 to	 pursue	 their	
individual	maximizing	utility	over	an	infinite	time	horizon	and	with	full	knowledge	of	possible	
outcomes	 and	 perfect	 foresight.	 This	 is	 precisely	 the	 opposite	 of	 consumer	 behaviour	 as	
viewed	 in	 Keynes’s	 macroeconomics,	 where	 perfect	 foresight	 and	 full	 rationality	 are	 not	
deemed	acceptable	assumptions,	because	probability	calculus	is	not	applicable:	when	there	is	
uncertainty,	as	 is	 the	case	 in	human	affairs	 in	general	and	 in	economic	matters	 in	particular,	
such	calculation	is	not	feasible.	
The	 assumption	 of	 perfect	 foresight	 was	 discredited	 after	 the	 events	 of	 2007-8.	 This	
meant	 bringing	 some	 modifications	 into	 the	 standard	 macro-models	 to	 incorporate	 limited	
rationality	 and	 knowledge,	 imperfections	 and	 rigidities	 in	 the	 goods,	 labour	 and	 financial	
markets.	 However,	 these	 modifications	 were	 made	 within	 a	 theoretical	 apparatus	 which	
remains	unchanged	 in	 its	main	 features	 and,	 in	 any	 case,	 still	 quite	 the	opposite	of	 the	way	
Keynes	understood	and	described	economic	behaviour,	which	was	never	imputed	to	abstract	
economic	agents,	but	always	to	individuals	who	have	specific	functions	and	characteristics.	
	Consumers,	 entrepreneurs	 or	 speculators	 always	 make	 their	 decisions	 in	 the	 face	 of	
uncertainty;	therefore,	according	to	Keynes,	their	behaviour	cannot	be	described	as	guided	by	
an	optimizing	 rationality,	 as	 the	utilitarian	 tradition	would	have	 it.	 Economic	 choices	 require	
evaluation	of	the	available	information,	which	is	often	contradictory	or	ambiguous	and	most	of	
the	time	insufficient	to	offer	enough	elements	to	predict	the	future	course	of	events.	In	each	
specific	case	the	evidence	we	collect	bears	different	“weight”	in	the	argument	we	use	to	make	
our	choices,	on	the	basis	of	our	knowledge	and	experience.	
However,	decision-making	in	a	context	of	uncertainty	should	not	imply	the	impossibility	of	
making	decisions	according	to	reason,	although	the	reason	involved	here	is	not	the	rationality	
employed	 in	 orthodox	 economic	 theory.	 Keynes	 was	 not	 only	 a	 great	 economist,	 but	 an	
investor	on	a	 large	 scale,	 for	himself,	 his	 college	and	 insurance	 companies;	 at	King’s	College	
Archives,	 several	 unpublished	 papers	 document	 his	 investment	 strategy	 and	 philosophy,	
showing	how	painstakingly	he	collected	and	carefully	reviewed	all	the	evidence	before	making	
his	choices	(Cristiano	and	Marcuzzo	2018).	
Keynes’s	 rationality	 –	 which	 is	 not	 to	 be	 confused	 with	 optimizing	 choice	 –	 should	 be	
interpreted	 as	 “reasonableness”,	 a	 concept	 describing	 the	 attitude	 to	 adopt	 in	 situations	
where	following	the	rationality	 implied	by	economic	theory	might	 lead	to	very	unsatisfactory	
outcomes.	 Keynes	 refers	 to	 it	 when	 dealing	 with	 the	 questions	 of	 the	 War	 Reparations	
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imposed	on	Germany,	 insisted	upon	by	the	victorious	powers	after	 the	First	World	War,	and	
again	in	the	negotiations	on	the	repayment	of	loans	to	Great	Britain	made	by	the	United	States	
during	the	Second	World	War.	And	the	question	continues	to	arise:	was	it	“reasonable”	not	to	
rescue	Lehman	Brothers	but	to	let	it	go	bankrupt?	
So	 far	 I	 have	 been	 arguing	 on	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	General	 Theory	 as	 a	 revolution	 in	
economic	 thinking;	now	 I	would	 like	 to	move	on	 to	a	more	 specific	 issue,	namely	when	and	
whether	 government	 intervention	 is	 called	 for	 to	 correct	market	 forces,	 since	 this	 is	what	 is	
usually,	and	in	an	unqualified	way,	understood	as	the	Keynesian	message.		
Adam	Smith	had	already	shown	how	rules	and	limitations	are	needed	to	prevent	market	
failures:	on	defence,	education	and	other	“public	goods”	 the	market	simply	does	not	deliver	
the	 best.	 This	 is	 not	 the	 crux	 of	 the	 matter	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Keynes’s	 subversion	 of	 the	
mainstream	 approach,	 but	 rather	 the	 role	 of	 effective	 demand	 in	 generating,	 income,	
increasing	production	and	guaranteeing	employment.	 It	 is	 the	 low	 level	of	effective	demand,	
not	the	rigidity	of	money	wages,	which	accounts	for	underemployment	equilibrium.	
Contrary	to	the	opinion	of	the	mainstream	economists,	Keynes	does	not	assign	to	prices	
(wages	 and	 interest	 rate	 included)	 the	 task	 of	 adjusting	 supply	 and	 demand	 to	 bring	 the	
system	 to	 full	 employment	equilibrium.	Only	by	 supporting	 a	high	 level	 of	 demand,	 through	
policies	designed	to	do	so,	can	this	goal	be	attained.	
However,	Keynes	was	not	in	favour	of	indiscriminate	deficit-financed	public	investments:	
in	 the	General	 Theory	we	 do	 find	 an	 apology	 for	 government	 intervention,	 but	 this	 is	 to	 be	
interpreted	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 need	 to	 control	 the	 total	 level	 of	 investment,	 through	 direct	 or	
indirect	action	by	a	public	or	semi-public	body,	always	taking	into	account	market	incentives,	
and	favouring	a	climate	of	business	confidence.	This	is	clearly	spelt	out	by	Keynes:	
	“If	the	State	is	able	to	determine	the	aggregate	amount	of	resources	devoted	to	augmenting	
the	 instruments	 and	 the	 basic	 rate	 of	 reward	 to	 those	 who	 own	 them,	 it	 will	 have	
accomplished	all	that	is	necessary”	(CWK	VII:	378).	
Similarly,	 on	 the	 origin	 and	 structure	 of	 the	 welfare	 state,	 Keynes’s	 ideas	 were	 not	
represented	faithfully	(see	Backhouse	and	Bateman	2012).	He	was	not	in	favour	of	high	taxes	
to	pay	for	social	benefits	and	pensions,	the	costs	of	which	ought	to	be	borne	by	the	employers,	
whose	interest	was	to	have	a	fit	and	healthy	labour	force	(CWK	XXVII:	224).	He	was	in	favour	of	
making	the	State	accountable	to	the	taxpayer	for	the	goods	and	services	provided,	associating	
“as	 closely	as	possible	 the	 cost	of	particular	 services	with	 the	 sources	out	of	which	 they	are	
provided”,	for	he	believed	that	“this	is	the	only	way	by	which	to	preserve	sound	accounting,	to	
measure	efficiency,	to	maintain	economy	and	to	keep	the	public	properly	aware	of	what	things	
cost”	(CWK	XXVII:	225).		
He	helped	Beveridge	to	draft	the	Social	Insurance	and	Allied	Services,	the	1942	Beveridge	
Plan,	as	it	was	called,	and	gave	his	support	it	to	having	it	approved.	Keynes	was	appreciative	of	
the	“new	features”	of	Beveridge’s	Plan,	namely	“the	extension	of	 the	social	security	benefits	
and	contributions	to	the	whole	of	the	population,	and	not	merely	to	the	present	contributory	
classes”	 (Keynes	 CWK	XXVII:	 252),	 but	 he	was	 concerned	 about	 the	 budgetary	 aspects	 of	 it.	
However,	 while	 both	 Keynes	 and	 Beveridge	 were	 preoccupied	 with	 the	 moral	 and	 social	
problems	 deriving	 from	 unemployment,	 they	 looked	 for	 solutions	 along	 different	 paths.	 For	
Beveridge,	 it	 was	 the	 human	 fight	 against	 scarcity,	 the	 plague	 of	 cycles	 in	 production	 and	
business	 confidence	 –	 as	 unpredictable	 as	 weather	 and	 natural	 calamities,	 as	 he	 saw	 them	
(Harris	[1977]	1997).	Social	 insurance	was	meant	to	disjoint	 individual	coverage	from	general	
economic	 performance.	 Keynes,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 thought	 that	 by	 making	 the	 future	
dependent	on	the	economic	success	of	an	active	social	investment	policy	it	would	be	possible	
to	free	individuals	from	the	deprivations	deriving	from	unemployment.	
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Keynes	 did	 not	 believe	 in	 the	 idea	 embraced	 by	Malthus	 and	Mandeville	 that	 opulent	
consumption	by	the	rich	provided	the	source	of	 income	and	employment	and,	therefore,	the	
key	to	economic	growth.	 In	the	General	Theory	consumption	 is	seen	as	the	necessary	means	
for	 the	 well-being	 of	 society;	 the	 propellant,	 so	 to	 speak,	 in	 the	 machinery	 to	 boost	
employment	and	income.	However,	Keynes	sees	two	major	problems	related	to	consumption.	
The	 first	 is	 satiation,	 which	 he	 believed	 derived	 from	 a	 “fundamental	 psychological	 law”,	
according	 to	 which	 “men	 are	 disposed,	 as	 a	 rule	 and	 on	 the	 average,	 to	 increase	 their	
consumption	as	 their	 income	 increases,	but	not	by	as	much	as	 the	 increase	 in	 their	 income”	
(CWK	VII,	p.	96).	It	follows	that,	since		
“the	larger	our	incomes,	the	greater,	unfortunately,	 is	the	margin	between	our	incomes	and	
our	consumption”,	the	government	must	find	ways	to	fill	the	gap,	unless	it	accepts	a	level	of	
unemployment	sufficient	“to	keep	us	so	poor	that	our	consumption	falls	short	of	our	income	
by	no	more	than	the	equivalent	of	the	physical	provision	for	future	consumption	which	it	pays	
to	produce	to-day”	(CWK	VII:	105).	
The	second	problem	with	consumption	is	how	best	to	bring	about	the	desired	increase	in	
the	propensity	to	consume	in	order	to	sustain	aggregate	demand.	The	means	could	be	found	
in	 a	 fiscal	 policy	 aiming	 at	 more	 equitable	 distribution	 of	 incomes	 (CWK	 XIV:	 16),	 thereby	
increasing	aggregate	consumption.	However,	this	is	a	policy	that	is	bound	to	come	up	against	
opposition,	and	by	no	means	easy	to	implement.	Alternatively,	fiscal	policy	can	be	directed	to	
boosting	aggregate	consumption	through	public	expenditure,	entrusting	the	government	with	
“the	 task	 of	 adjusting	 to	 one	 another	 the	 propensity	 to	 consume	 and	 the	 inducement	 to	
invest”	(CWK	VII:	380)	or	“making	public	investment	a	counterweight	to	fluctuations	of	private	
investment”	(CWK	XXVII:	381).			
Keynes’s	 love	of	paradoxes	 lies	behind	 the	 famous	example	 that,	as	 Joan	Robinson	 tells	
us,	was	meant	“to	penetrate	the	thick	walls	of	obscurantism	of	the	old	laissez-faire	orthodoxy”	
(Robinson	1964:	91).	The	suggestion	was	for	the	Treasury	to	bury	bottles	filled	with	banknotes	
and	 let	private	 individuals	 lease	the	ground,	dig	out	the	bottles	and	pocket	the	money	(CWK	
VII:	 129).	 This	 is	 clearly	 a	paradox,	 against	 the	 view	 that	 every	operation	 should	make	a	 full	
profit	or	not	be	done	at	all.	Keynes’s	makes	his	point	–	it	does	not	matter	how	public	money	is	
spent,	 as	 long	 as	 it	 is	 spent,	 since	 it	 will	 generate	 income	 and,	 through	 the	 multiplier,	 the	
savings	necessary	to	finance	the	initial	expenditure	–	to	illustrate	a	principle,	not	to	provide	a	
blueprint	of	“useful”	public	work	schemes.	Keynes	spelt	it	out	clearly:	
	‘it	would,	indeed,	be	more	sensible	to	build	houses	and	the	like;	but	if	there	are	political	and	
practical	 difficulties	 in	 the	way	 of	 this,	 the	 above	would	 be	 better	 than	 nothing’	 (CWK	VII:	
129).		
The	 political	 difficulties	 mentioned	 by	 Keynes	 arise	 mainly	 from	 “the	 education	 of	 our	
statesman	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 the	 classical	 economics”.	 Moreover,	 expenditure	 on	 useful	
goods	and	 services	may	not	always	be	equally	practical:	 “Two	pyramids,	 two	masses	 for	 the	
dead,	 are	 twice	as	 good	as	one;	but	not	 two	 railways	 from	London	 to	York”	 (CWK	VII:	 129).	
Moreover	 “unless	 the	 rate	 of	 interest	 is	 falling	 pari	 passu”	 with	 the	 marginal	 efficiency	 of	
investment	 there	 is	 a	 limit	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 increasing	 the	 stock	 of	 wealth	 by	means	 of	
“useful”	 forms	 of	 loan	 expenditure.	 Waste	 results	 not	 when	 expenditure	 is	 channelled	 to	
objects	which	are	not	“useful”,	but	when	they	are	not	“economically”	viable.		
In	Keynes’s	work	we	find	many	sarcastic	comments	on	common	prejudices	against	public	
spending,	which	can	equally	well	be	applied	to	today’s	defences	of	austerity	programs.	I	would	
like	to	mention	at	least	two:	
	“the	man	who	regards	all	this	[loan-financed	public	works,	particularly	public	expenditure	on	
housing]	 as	 a	 senseless	 extravagance	 which	 will	 impoverish	 the	 nation,	 as	 compared	 with	
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doing	nothing	and	leaving	millions	unemployed,	should	be	recognized	for	a	lunatic”	(CWK	XXI:	
338).	
And	again:	
“When	we	have	unemployed	men	and	unemployed	plant	and	more	savings	than	we	are	using	
at	 home,	 it	 is	 utterly	 imbecile	 to	 say	 that	we	 cannot	 afford	 these	 things.	 For	 it	 is	with	 the	
unemployed	 plant,	 and	with	 nothing	 else,	 that	 these	 things	 are	 done.	 To	 have	 labour	 and	
cement	and	steel	and	machinery	and	transport	lying	by,	and	to	say	that	you	cannot	afford	to	
embark	on	harbour	works	or	whatever	 it	may	be	 is	the	delirium	of	mental	confusion”	(CWK	
XIX:	765-766).	
The	 two	pillars	of	 the	Welfare	State	–	distrust	of	market	 forces	and,	with	 it,	 reliance	on	
government	 intervention	 to	 bring	 about	 full	 employment	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 lack	 of	
confidence	in	the	power	of	liberalism	to	achieve	economic	security	and	social	stability	on	the	
other,	came	from	different	traditions:	Beveridge,	the	heir	to	the	Fabians,	relied	on	neoclassical	
economic	theory,	while	Keynes,	the	revolutionary	economist,	relied	on	reformed	liberalism	for	
his	social	policy	(Marcuzzo	2010).	
Keynes’s	 approach	 to	 the	 way	 to	 fight	 unemployment	 should	 not	 identified	 with	 the	
welfare	 state,	 nor	with	 indiscriminate	 public	 spending,	with	 no	 concern	 for	 the	 government	
budget,	nor	with	attributing	the	causes	of	unemployment	to	the	rigidity	of	wages	and	prices,	
nor	 indeed	 with	 all	 the	 other	 distortions	 of	 the	 General	 Theory	 we	 find	 in	 the	 literature,	
showing	how	little	it	was	read	or	understood.	
Keynes’s	 message	 needs	 to	 be	 adapted	 to	 the	 present	 domestic	 and	 international	
circumstances,	but	it	is	still	topical	in	its	appeal	to	those	common	good	values	which	markets	
are	 sometimes	 unable	 to	 deliver.	 Keynes	was	 confident	 that	 addressing	market	 failures	was	
possible	 by	 placing	 in	 charge	 of	 institutions	 created	 for	 the	 purpose	 people	 –	 often	 chosen	
among	his	group	of	friends	–	who	were	of	high	moral	standards	and	fortitude.	
While	 Keynes	 rejected	 consequentialism	 in	 ethics,	 he	 endorsed	 consequentialism	in	 his	
political	 philosophy,	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 rules	 have	 to	 be	 set	 for	 given	 goals.	 The	 relevant	
question	becomes	how	these	goals	are	chosen	and	how	rigid	or	 fixed	 these	 rules	 should	be.	
Keynes	 rejected	 the	 abstract	 and	 formal	 character	 of	 rules,	 claiming	 that	 we	 should	 try	 to	
reduce	the	social	damage	caused	by	conventions	and	engage	in	substituting	them	with	other,	
less	socially	harmful	conventions.		
It	follows	that,	for	Keynes:	
		“The	 reformer	 is	 not	 he	 who	 would	 impose	 his	 own	 values	 on	 society,	 but	 he	 who	
understands	better	than	others	the	potential	for	change	in	the	moral	conventions	of	society	
itself,	and	acts	in	order	to	affect	such	change”.	(Carabelli	and	De	Vecchi	1999:	291).		
Two	 questions	 then	 arise:	 a)	 where	 does	 the	 “better	 understanding”	 of	 the	 reformer	
come	from;	b)	which	are	the	appropriate	actions	to	change	the	moral	conventions	of	society.	
The	answers	to	these	questions	are	scattered	among	Keynes’s	early	writings	on	ethics	and	
politics	 and	 his	mature	 work	 in	 economics,	 but	 they	 can	 also	 be	 gathered	 by	 reviewing	 his	
activities	 as	 policy	 adviser	 and	 even	 his	 practical	 experience	 in	 various	 institutions.	 It	 is	 in	
particular	on	the	importance	Keynes	attributed	to	expert	advice,	to	“superior	knowledge”,	and	
his	elitism	that	I	mean	to	focus	attention.	
A	good	starting	point	is	a	passage	from	a	famous	letter	to	Hayek:	
“Dangerous	acts	can	be	done	safely	in	a	community	which	think	and	feels	rightly,	which	would	
be	the	way	to	hell	 if	 they	were	executed	by	those	who	think	and	feel	wrongly”	(CWK	XXVII:	
987-8).		
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To	think	and	to	feel	“rightly”	or	“wrongly”	is	contingent	on	two	elements:	knowledge	and	
values.	Skidelsky	labelled	Keynes	“a	meritocratic	elitist”	(Skidelsky	2009:	223),	and	he	was	not	
the	only	one	to	take	this	view.	O’Donnell	makes	the	interesting	point	that:	
“Keynes’s	 elitism	 [is]	 of	 an	 essentially	 intellectual	 variety,	 as	 distinct	 from	 those	 elitisms	
stemming	 from	political,	 financial	or	military	power.	With	 individual	varying	 in	abilities,	and	
with	rationality	linked	to	logical	insight	and	knowledge,	the	presumption	is	strong	that	those	
with	 greatest	 mental	 power	 and	 education	 will	 have	 the	 greatest	 capacity	 in	 their	 given	
fields”	(O’	Donnell	1984:	66)	
And	he	concludes	that	“Elitism	is	always	a	possible	companion	of	intuitionist	philosophy”	
(ibid).	 It	was	 the	 belief	 in	 the	 rationality	 of	 ends	as	well	 as	means	 that	 led	 Keynes	 to	 value	
“superior	 knowledge”	 as	 the	 guide	 to	 political	 actions.	 Superior	 knowledge	 can	 be	 acquired	
through	experience	and	education,	and	only	those	who	have	acquired	it	can	be	entrusted	with	
the	management	of	affairs	or	enactment	of	reforms.	
The	rational	pursuit	of	individual	interest	in	economics,	according	to	the	utilitarian	creed,	
does	not	guarantee	the	collective	good,	which	Keynes	identified	with	full	employment.	It	is	an	
assumption	that	leads	to	a	logical	fallacy,	which	Keynes	identifies	as	the	fallacy	of	composition.		
For	instance,	attempts	to	reduce	real	wages	or	increase	the	saving	of	individuals	on	the	basis	
of	an	individual	rationale	will	not	achieve	the	aim	if	undertaken	by	all,	since	aggregate	prevails	
over	 individual	 effect.	 Another	 example	 is	 when	 the	 level	 of	 aggregate	 demand	 is	 kept	
drastically	 low	within	 a	 country	 to	 satisfy	 the	 reasons	 of	 the	 victor	 or	 creditor,	 leading	 to	 a	
deflationary	 potential	 for	 all	 the	 economies.	 Thus,	 lack	 of	 reasonableness	 leads	 to	
consequences	not	only	morally	reprehensible	but	also	economically	disastrous	for	anyone	who	
has	sought	guidance	solely	from	the	individual	point	of	view.	
In	 Keynes’s	 economics	 the	 impasse	 of	 failure	 to	 achieve	 the	 aggregate	 effect	 of	 full	
utilisation	of	resources	can	be	remedied	with	a	set	of	direct	and	indirect	instruments	designed	
to	overcome	individual	inertia	and	generate	the	level	of	demand	necessary	to	raise	the	level	of	
employment.	 Much	 has	 been	 written	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Keynes	 endorsed	 state	
intervention	 (Marcuzzo	 2010,	 Backhouse	 and	 Bateman	 2012).	 It	 is	 worth	 recalling	 the	main	
points	here.	
Keynes’s	 argument	 is	 summarized	 in	 the	need	 for	 fiscal	 stimulus	 to	boost	 the	 economy	
from	the	depths	of	recession;	the	burden	of	the	deficit	 is	not	seen	as	the	main	drawback	for	
government	 intervention,	 but	 as	 a	 condition	 necessary	 to	 address	 a	 failure	 in	 aggregate	
demand.	 This	 argument	 does	 not,	 however,	 imply	 unqualified	 government	 intervention.	
Government	expenditure	 is	to	be	finalised	to	provide	enough	 investment	to	counterweight	a	
decline	 in	private	 investment	and	a	 level	of	consumption	 insufficient	to	generate	the	 level	of	
aggregate	demand	necessary	to	maintain	full	employment.	
Although	Keynes’s	mistrust	of	the	smooth	working	of	market	forces	came	long	before	the	
General	 Theory,	 the	 case	 for	 intervention	 is	made	 there	 forcefully	 in	 the	 case	 of	 aggregate	
demand	failure.	However,	 the	policy	message	 in	the	General	Theory	 is	 to	sustain	the	 level	of	
investment	–	more	“stabilizing	business	confidence”	(Bateman	1996:	148)	than	debt-financed	
public	 works.	 His	 reliance	 on	 “socializing	 investment”	 rather	 than	 fiscal	 policy	 aiming	 at	
smoothing	out	consumption	levels	over	the	cycle	shows	his	concern	for	the	size	of	the	deficit	
and	 the	 importance	 attributed	 to	 market	 incentives	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 desired	 level	 of	
employment.	“If	the	State	is	able	to	determine	the	aggregate	amount	of	resources	devoted	to	
augmenting	 the	 instruments	 [of	production]	and	 the	basic	 rate	of	 reward	 to	 those	who	own	
them,”	he	wrote	in	the	General	Theory,	“it	will	have	accomplished	all	that	is	necessary”	(CWK	
VII:	378).		
His	 “vision”	 of	 the	 future	 of	 capitalist	 society	 rested	 on	 the	 belief	 that	 freedom	 from	
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economic	constraints	would	allow	the	vast	majority	of	the	population	to	pursue	happiness	and	
enjoyment	 in	 their	 lives.	 “It	 is	not	any	 fear	of	a	 failure	of	physical	productivity	 to	provide	an	
adequate	material	standard	of	life	that	fills	me	with	foreboding,”	he	remarked,	addressing	the	
House	of	Lords	in	February	1943:	
	“The	real	problems	of	the	future	are	first	of	all	the	maintenance	of	peace,	of	international	co-
operation	 and	 amity,	 and	 beyond	 that	 the	 profound	moral	 and	 social	 problems	 of	 how	 to	
organize	material	abundance	to	yield	up	the	fruits	of	a	good	life”	(CWK	XXVII:	261)			
Keynes	 rejected	 utilitarianism,	 both	 in	 ethics	 and	 politics,	 and	 he	 did	 not	 endorse	
consequentialism	 in	his	ethical	philosophy,	but	he	accepted	 it	 in	his	political	philosophy,	 the	
purpose	of	which,	he	believed,	was	to	provide	reasons	for	action.	
According	 to	 Keynes,	 the	 goal	 of	 an	 ethically	 rational	 society	 could	 be	 achieved	 by	
overcoming	 the	 economic	 and	moral	 obstacles	 that	 encumbered	 contemporary	 society.	 For	
Keynes	persuasion	–	the	primary	tool	of	political	action	–	provided	the	means	to	given	ends.	
These	means	were	to	be	grounded	in	sound	knowledge	and	experience,	which	are	the	basis	of	
trust	and	confidence	in	expert	advice	and	council.	He	wrote:	
“The	first	condition	of	successful	control	and	useful	interference	of	whatever	kind	from	above	
is	that	it	must	be	done	with	knowledge”	(CWK	XIX:	643).	
Keynes’s	 view	 of	 economics,	 whereby	 full	 employment	 was	 the	 instrument	 or	 “social	
primary”	means	to	a	good	life,	was	intertwined	with	his	consequentialism	in	politics,		
In	conclusion,	his	prescription	for	a	better	society	lies	in	setting	rules	and	limitations	in	the	
market	arena,	not	letting	individual	self-interest	prevail,	and	putting	some	governing	bodies	in	
charge	of	 filling	 the	gap	when	deficient	aggregate	demand	occurs,	 so	 that	 the	acquisition	of	
material	goods	and	the	fruition	of	the	enjoyments	of	life	be	not	a	privilege	of	the	few	but	the	
conquest	of	civilization.	There	are	at	least	two	reasons	why	the	ideas	put	forward	by	Keynes	in	
the	1930s	are	still	relevant	for	the	world	of	today.	The	first,	and	perhaps	the	most	important,	is	
the	global	 recession	which	has	been	persisting	since	2008-9	and	even	now	 is	showing	only	a	
few	timid	signs	of	recovery,	 forcefully	reminding	us	of	the	events	which	prompted	Keynes	to	
look	 for	 solutions	 to	 mass	 unemployment	 and	 economic	 disruption.	 The	 second	 is	 the	 still	
pervasive	 free-market	 ideology	 that	 inspired	 the	policies	and	behaviour	 that	played	no	small	
part	 in	 fuelling	 the	crisis.	 The	 traditional	 remedies	 to	 cure	 the	1930s	 recession	–	 reliance	on	
market	mechanisms	and	balancing	the	budget	–	have	been	resurrected	 in	the	present	times,	
and	while	criticism	of	the	austerity	policies	is	gaining	momentum	Keynes’s	arguments	still	fail	
to	be	widely	and	fully	accepted.	It	is	time	we	woke	up	to	them.	
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